HIGHBuilt-inProduct / Revenue mix
92%
homebuilding
“10-K Item 1: 'Homebuilding is our core business, generating 92% of consolidated revenues of $34.3 billion'”
DHI · Concentration risk · 10-K extracted
D.R. Horton (DHI) concentration risks
Updated
The most significant concentration D.R. Horton discloses is homebuilding at 92%, classified HIGH by disclosed size. Below: the full set from the latest 10-K — verbatim quotes, filing references, and a synthesis of what these exposures mean together.
Model-generated analysis — not investment advice. Not a registered investment advisor. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
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Source: D.R. Horton’s SEC Form 10-K filed — view the filing on SEC EDGAR ↗
At a glance
Disclosed-size breakdown · 2 disclosed concentrations
HIGH2
MEDIUM0
LOW0
Disclosed concentrations
Each card carries a disclosed-size chip (HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW — how large the exposure is as a share of revenue, not how dangerous it is) and a nature tag: Built-in(the company’s own model, geography, or products) or Outside party (an external customer, supplier, or distributor it relies on).
HIGHOutside partyCustomer
71%
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae
“10-K Item 1A: 'approximately 71% of our mortgage loans were sold directly to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or into securities backed by Ginnie Mae'”
TrendMatrix Research · concentration synthesis
What these concentrations mean together
updated 2026-06-24The company's concentration profile is dominated by two high-share exposures that are related: a structural product-mix tilt toward homebuilding and a counterparty dependency on government-sponsored entities in the mortgage channel. Homebuilding is the core business, generating 92% of consolidated revenues of $34.3 billion, an extremely high share that is structural by nature — it reflects a deliberate strategic focus rather than an accidental concentration in one product or geography. The consequence is that revenues move tightly with housing-starts volumes, affordability conditions, and regional demand, which are broad macroeconomic and rate-sensitive variables rather than idiosyncratic single-customer risks. The mortgage-channel exposure layers a dependency on top of that structural tilt. Approximately 71% of the company's mortgage loans were sold directly to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or into securities backed by Ginnie Mae. This is a high-share counterparty relationship with agencies whose terms, guarantee fees, and program parameters are set by government policy rather than commercial negotiation — which means the risk is less about counterparty failure and more about regulatory or policy changes affecting the agency market. Together, the two exposures reinforce each other: weakness in housing demand would reduce origination volume at the same time that mortgage liquidity through the agencies becomes most valuable as a risk buffer. That coupling is the key cross-cutting risk worth monitoring.
For the engine’s reasoning on DHI’s current verdict — including which dimensions drove the score — see the per-dimension breakdown.
Industry peers · Residential Construction
Peer concentration profile
| Symbol | Name | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVCO | Cavco Industries, Inc. | 3 | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| KBH | KB Home | 2 | 2 | 0 | 4 |
| DHI● | D.R. Horton, Inc. | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| IBP | Installed Building Products, In | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| GRBK | Green Brick Partners, Inc. | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| LEN | Lennar Corporation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Concentration counts reflect items disclosed in each peer’s most recent 10-K; disclosed-size classification uses TrendMatrix’s internal 10-K extraction taxonomy.