Value
4.4/10data confidence 67%| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| P/S | 8.2 |
| EV/EBITDA | 0.0 |
| p ocf | 6.6 |
| Analyst target | 4.0 |
- ▸P/OCF: 16.6x (FFO proxy — REITs gated off P/E)
Updated
Model-generated analysis — not investment advice. Not a registered investment advisor. Past performance does not guarantee future results.
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| Pillar | Expectation | Trend |
|---|---|---|
OUTFRONT beat earnings estimates in 3 of the last 4 quarters with an average positive surprise of approximately 27%, including a 55% beat in the most recent quarter, demonstrating consistent operational execution. Earnings | The company continues to beat consensus estimates in at least 2 of the next 4 quarters, sustaining the pattern of positive earnings surprises. | →Stable |
| CounterThe earnings beat streak comes against a backdrop of declining growth prospects, and the most recent miss-to-inline record suggests analysts have already tightened their models to realistic levels. | ||
A debt-to-equity ratio of 6.0 is among the highest in the dataset and carries a leverage penalty in the scoring model, constraining financial flexibility and leaving the company vulnerable to interest rate increases or revenue shortfalls. Bear case | Debt-to-equity declines below 5.0 within 12 months as free cash flow is directed toward debt repayment. | →Stable |
| CounterReal estate investment trusts routinely operate with elevated leverage ratios and assess debt capacity through funds from operations coverage, not debt-to-equity; the leverage may be appropriate for the business model. | ||
New York City transit revenues represent 57% of total revenue, creating a single-point-of-failure risk if transit ridership declines, the MTA renegotiates contract terms, or remote work permanently reduces commuter volumes. Bear case | New York transit revenue concentration falls below 50% within 24 months as the company diversifies into other markets. | →Stable |
| CounterNew York transit advertising is a premium and defensible market with long-term contract structures; concentration in a dominant market may represent a competitive advantage rather than a risk. | ||
Return on equity of 27% is notably high for a REIT and indicates the company is generating substantial returns on the equity capital invested in its outdoor advertising franchise. Quality breakdown | Return on equity remains above 20% for at least 3 of the next 4 reporting periods as the advertising market holds. | →Stable |
| CounterHigh ROE in a highly levered company is partly a mathematical artifact of a small equity base rather than a measure of true economic returns; normalizing for the leverage penalty reveals weaker underlying returns. | ||
CounterThe earnings beat streak comes against a backdrop of declining growth prospects, and the most recent miss-to-inline record suggests analysts have already tightened their models to realistic levels.
CounterReal estate investment trusts routinely operate with elevated leverage ratios and assess debt capacity through funds from operations coverage, not debt-to-equity; the leverage may be appropriate for the business model.
CounterNew York transit advertising is a premium and defensible market with long-term contract structures; concentration in a dominant market may represent a competitive advantage rather than a risk.
CounterHigh ROE in a highly levered company is partly a mathematical artifact of a small equity base rather than a measure of true economic returns; normalizing for the leverage penalty reveals weaker underlying returns.
OUTFRONT Media has beaten earnings in 3 of the last 4 quarters and posted a strong return on equity of 27%, but debt-to-equity of 6.0 and near-total dependence on New York transit revenues (57% concentration) leave limited room for error if that market deteriorates.
Falsifiable statement — pillar-level invalidators below. Engine-derived; not personalized advice.
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| P/S | 8.2 |
| EV/EBITDA | 0.0 |
| p ocf | 6.6 |
| Analyst target | 4.0 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| ROE | 8.9 |
| ROA | 2.8 |
| Gross margin | 6.1 |
| Op margin | 5.3 |
| Net margin | 5.0 |
| Current ratio | 3.3 |
| FCF quality | 6.7 |
| Moat | 6.9 |
| Piotroski F | 6.7 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| Rev growth | 5.0 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| RSI | 4.3 |
| MACD | 9.6 |
| OBV | 1.0 |
| MA position | 9.0 |
| Volume | 0.8 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| Analyst rating | 5.0 |
| Price target | 6.5 |
| erm sentiment | 5.0 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| materiality | 4.5 |
| insider conviction | 2.6 |
| holder change | 5.1 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| value rank | 6.1 |
| quality rank | 4.2 |
| growth rank | 5.7 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| bollinger | 1.6 |
| support resistance | 1.8 |
| 52w position | 9.0 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| short interest | 7.8 |
| days to cover | 8.2 |
| volatility | 5.4 |
| put call | 9.9 |
| implied vol | 5.1 |
| beta | 5.1 |
| debt equity | 0.0 |
| Component | Sub-score |
|---|---|
| erm | 5.0 |
| earnings history | 10.0 |
| earnings timing | 5.0 |
| surprise avg | 10.0 |
| dividend safety | 3.5 |
Multiple concerning factors. Consider reducing position.
L4:PATH_F_SELLSetup— — No clear chart pattern; technical signals are mixed
EdgeNo clear edge — No clear edge identified
SuitabilityAggressive — Beta 1.47>1.3
The F-path SELL output reflects an overall score of 3.6 below the 5.6 soft trigger — multiple weakening dimensions accumulated rather than a single hard-floor breach. The strongest dimension ( Catalyst at 6.7) was not enough to lift the adjusted overall above the threshold. Co-occurring failed gates ( ASYMMETRY:-0.5=NEGATIVE) reinforce the read. Current asymmetry R:R is -0.46 — supplementary context, not the trigger for this path.
The strongest dimensions are Catalyst at 6.7, Risk (lower is worse) at 5.9, and Quality at 5.7; the weakest are Technical at 4.1, Insider at 4.1, and Value at 4.4. The V9 engine flagged 1 failed gate with 2 warnings, producing an asymmetric reward-to-risk of -0.46 and an engine sizing output of AVOID.
Falsifying conditions — when triggered, the corresponding pillar's thesis is invalidated.
Trip ifEPS surprise falls below 0% in at least 3 of the next 4 quarters.
Trip ifDebt-to-equity ratio rises above 7.0 in any reporting period.
Trip ifNew York transit revenue concentration rises above 65% of total revenue.
Trip ifReturn on equity falls below 15% for 2 consecutive reporting periods.